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AN ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS AMONG THE VATICAN, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 
AND THE STATE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
by Marci Sulak 
Marci Sulak is a graduate student in the department of Theology and Religious 
Studies at Villanova University, Villanova, PA. She received the B.A. degree from 
the University of Texas at Austin and the M.A. from the University of Notre Dame. 
In 1993-1994 she lived and worked in Ceske Budejovice, where she was able to speak 
, with a number of Catholic priests who had been ordained secretly. 
Since the Velvet Revolution in November, 1989, two events have not yet transpired; 
surprisingly, the church has not legally separated from the state, and not surprisingly, the 
Vatican has not formally re-evaluated the conditions necessary for the local Church to 
participate in the unity of the universal Church. This paper will examine the circumstances 
that lead one to believe these events would be likely or desirable with the end of Communism 
in Czechoslovakia. 
In order to understand the behavior of the Czech Catholic hierarchy from 1948-1989 in 
its relations with the Vatican and with the state, it is necessary to understand the importance 
of obedience and authority for the Roman Catholic Church. The Eucharist, which is at the 
center of Catholicism, is the sacrament of communion among all Catholics with God through 
the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. Because this communion is 
symbolized by the episcopal college, in apostolic succession, in union with one another and 
with the Roman pontiff, there can be no sacrament without the hierarchy. Therefore, any 
church :-~ctivity taking place without the hierarchy's knowledge or approval often has its 
validit\ .Juestioned. 
Thv 1992 Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church from the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of Faith entitled "The Church as Communion" lays out the necessary conditions for 
each local Church to partake of the unity of the universal Church: "For each particular 
Church to be fully Church, that is, the particular presence of the universal Church with all 
its essential elements, and hence constituted after the model of the universal Church, there 
must be present in it, as a proper element, the supreme authority of the Church: the 
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episcopal college together with their head the supreme pontiff, and never apart from him.'"1 
This letter followed the fall of Communism and thus, the end of religious persecution in 
Eastern Europe. Though it was not meant to specifically address post-Communist Eastern 
Europe, in many ways it is an insufficient response to the situation of the Catholic Church 
in Communist and immediately post-Communist Czechoslovakia. Measured against the 
practice of the last forty years, the Letter to the Bishops does not reflect the experience of 
many Eastern European Churches, for whom there was no episcopal college in any real sense. 
The Communist suppression of the Church may have led the Vatican to decide what sort of 
compromises are valid in a situation where compromise is and was the only solution to keep 
the Church together. 
It is more unlikely that the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith will formally 
re-evaluate and elaborate on the role of the hierarchy in crisis situations than it is that the 
Catholic Church will attain legal separation from the post-Communist state in the Czech 
Republic. Throughout the years of Communism in Czechoslovakia, the state seriously abused 
the lack of legal separation between Church and state. Because the Communist leaders 
believed the Catholic Church offered the greatest organized resistance to the implementation 
of Communist ideology, they sought to gain complete control over it, to turn it into a 
national church, and to thereby use it as an instrument for gaining its own political ends. 
'Divide and conquer' was the main strategy, and it was put into effect within a year after the 
Communist takeover.2 
What follows is a brief description of Communist state policy toward the Roman Catholic 
Church, proceeded by a discussion of the major divisions that occurred in the Czechoslovak 
Church from 1948-1992: between the state-recognized Catholic Church and the Vatican, 
between the state-recognized Catholic Church and the underground Catholic Church, and 
between the 'Peace Movement' priests and those who did not join the movement. These 
divisions are not simple and clear cut. It is not implied that all who pledged allegiance to 
the Czechoslovak state were, in reality, completely aligned with it, nor were all who worked 
underground in the resistance as faithful to Rome as they could have been. Furthermore, one 
ought not attempt to guess at the motivations behind clerical alignment. Rather, the focus 
. will be on the consequences of the various alignments and actions of the hierarchy on the 
Czechoslovak Church as a whole in terms of inner-Church unity and communion with Rome. 
1(Sec 13) Catholic International, 761-776 
2 One reason this strategy seemed particularly attractive to the communist government was that 
both under the Hapsburgs and between the two world wars the principle of state support of the 
Church was already somewhat in place. The communist government had only to continue and 
re-shape it to control the churches effectively. 
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In 1949 the Government Bureau for Church Affairs was established. Law 217 states the 
Bureau's purpose: " ... to see to it that Church life and religious life develop in accordance 
with the Constitution and principles of the people's democratic order." In order to more 
efficiently oversee the Church's Activity, Proclamation 320 created Church Sections of the 
Provincial People's Committees on May 12, 1950. The Sections were given complete control 
over the Church. For example, they had the right to inspect all activities of Churches and 
religious associations. Their approval was needed for the creation of new parishes, 
congregations, religious communities; they issued or denied licenses to clergy, approved the 
appointment of lower clergy to posts established with the consent of the government, and 
handled the removal of those who had become 'ineligible' for such posts. A priest could be 
declared ineligible because of increasing Church membership in his parish, for being too 
energetic, or for refusing to cooperate sufficiently with the state. When a priest was 
removed, the church sections nominated his replacement and approved it, if indeed the priest 
were to have a replacement at all. Because all official priests were on the government 
payroll. the Sections were also responsible for granting salaries and personal emoluments, 
additional remunerations, rank allowances, "efficiency bonuses," and leave to members of the 
clergy.3 In addition, consent of the government was required for any priest to perform his 
duties. These duties were strictly limited to those of 'cult activity' in the parish to which he 
was assigned. He could celebrate the Mass, but was not allowed to teach, to make home 
visits in a priestly capacity, or to work with youth. The law became, in effect, 'what is not 
permitted by the state is prohibited.' 
Perhaps most importantly, the local committees of the Church Sections supervised the 
two remaining Catholic seminaries. They appointed faculty and closely regulated the 
admission of seminarians. According to Fr. Dolista, the current head of the theological 
seminary in Ceske Budejovice, this government selection of the seminarians created an 
atmosphere of suspicion. The seminarians were never sure who among them were informers. 
Not only were they placed under enormous pressure to cooperate with the state, but if they 
showed unusual resistance or were remarkably pious, they were deemed 'unworthy' for 
ordination. In addition, their studies were interrupted by two years of military service. 
3Gsovski, Vladimir, Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1955), p. 23. 
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In order to insure these laws would be followed without resistance, the clergy were 
required to take an oath of loyalty to the government.4 If they refused, they would not 
receive their license to perform their priestly functions. Should they be caught performing 
without a license, they were treated as criminals and subject to fines and imprisonment. 
Interestingly, the Vatican raised no objection to the oath of loyalty requested by the 
government. The Czech hierarchy and the Vatican had early on declared themselves non-
political.5 For the Czech hierarchy, the loyalty oath was largely a matter of 'paying to Caesar 
what belongs to Caesar.' The Vatican, itself relying on the obedience of its bishops, priests, 
and laity, was not threatened as long as the oath did not interfere with the clergy's duty to 
the Church. Furthermore, when the oath first became a requirement there was still some 
hope that the state would negotiate reasonably with the Church. 
The end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s witnessed the harshest acts against 
the Church. In 1949 hundreds of priests were convicted of criminal activity and imprisoned. 
During their trials, the presiding judge contended that the unruly priests were obeying the 
Vatican "which was influenced by the evil designs of American imperialism. Thus, they were 
trying to disrupt the people's democratic legal order and to restore capitalism in 
Czechoslovakia."6 Therefore, the Union of Czechoslovak Lawyers adopted a resolution 
classifying the Vatican as a "foreign enemy to be resisted" on September 23, 1949.7 The new 
priests who replaced the priests removed by the state (though many were never replaced), 
were more or less cooperative with the government, since the government appointed them. 
When members of the clergy voiced their opposition to the Church laws, the Minister 
of Justice, Dr. Cepicka (later appointed Chairman of the Government Bureau of Church 
Affairs), declared on October 14, 1949, "If the Church hierarchy believes religious freedom 
means freedom for them to commit subversive and disruptive acts against the state and the 
Government, they are mistaken and bear full responsibility for such an attitude ... Crime is 
4The loyalty pledge read: I promise on my honor and conscience to be faithful to the 
Czechoslovak Republic and to its people's democratic order, and I shall not undertake anything 
contrary to its interests, security and integrity. As a citizen of a people's democratic State, I shall 
conscientiously perform the duties inherent in my office and I shall do everything within my ability 
to support the efforts at [social] reconstruction for the welfare of the people.(Decree No. 219, Sec.l9). 
5For an in-depth analysis of Vatican diplomacy in Eastern Europe, please see Hansjakob Stehle's 
essay "Papal Eastern Diplomacy and the Vatican Apparatus." The English translation is available 
in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed. Pedro Ramet, (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1990), pp. 341-355. 
6Gsovski, pp. 37-39. 
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crime, even if it is ordered by the Vatican or the bishops."8 Following the instatement of the 
penal code of August 1, 1950, which made it possible to ·try clergy for a number of 
vaguely-defined crimes, thousands of priests were arrested. According to George Shuster, 
more than 3,000 priests were arrested in January of 1951 alone.9 
The 1950s saw the beginnings of underground church activity. Largely in response to the 
concern that not enough priests would be ordained to meet the demands of the population 
and that the priests who were licensed by the state would be too strongly under the control 
of the government to be good spiritual leaders, priests began to be secretly ordained. Even 
though engaging in priestly activity without a license was punishable by law, it appears that 
about 300 priests were secretly ordained between 1950 and 1989. About 50-60 of these were 
secretly trained in Czechoslovakia, but went abroad, to East Germany or Poland, where there 
was legal separation between Church and state, for ordination. The underground church 
provided for religious education and for Masses to be said in private homes in parishes that 
had no priests. More importantly, it provided a means of resisting state propaganda and 
served to check the influence of the state priests who had fallen into Communist hands. It 
is generally agreed that the underground Church operated with the Vatican's knowledge and 
approval, at least until the 1980s. 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s the Vatican began to grow uncomfortable with the 
underground Church because of its increasing independence. A major problem was the 
ambiguous situation of its central bishop, Felix Maria Davidek, who had been ordained a 
priest in 1945. Though secretly consecrated as a bishop, he had had the Vatican's approval 
at first. 10 In 1978, however, he was ordered to step down. Some of his actions were 
considered scandalous and later caused embarrassment to the other members of the 
8New York Times, October 15, 1949. 
9Shuster, George N., Religion Behind the Iron Curtain, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1954), p. 92. 
10Pedro Ramet disagrees on this point. He characterizes Davidek as a "psychologically unbalanced 
priest" who had been consecrated a bishop "without Vatican approval." He further claims that the 
government knew about his activity and tolerated it in the hope that it would cause "schismatic 
fissures within the clergy." See the book edited by him, Catholicism and Politics in Communist 
Societies, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 22. Most Czech priests today are reluctant 
to speak about Davidek; some claim no knowledge of his specific activities. 
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underground Church. Under him, at least three women and as many"as 80 married men were 
said to have been ordained. He himself is said to have taken a wife.U 
Another split in the Church was initiated by the Communist organization for Catholic 
priests called "The Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy" in 1951 and revived as "Pacem 
in Terris" after the 1968 invasion. "The Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy" was an 
attempt by the state to gain more control over the Church than it could get through the 
Office for Religious Affairs. Chaired by Josef Plojhar, an excommunicated priest, this 
organization took over the Catholic press, charitable organizations, and the two seminaries. 
When almost all the bishops refused to renounce loyalty to Rome and join, they were 
imprisoned or interned. Their vacancies were filled from among the Peace Movement 
priests, who were elected Vicars Capitular. 
According to Dolista, "Pacem in Terris" severely damaged trust and communication on 
all levels: among bishops, among the priests, between bishops and priests, andbetween the 
priests and their congregations. No one ever knew who among them might turn out to be an 
informer. They were not able to discern who joined for personal advantage and who did it 
only out of weakness or from enormous pressure. This inability to trust in and rely upon one 
another greatly reduced the Church's effectiveness and strength among the parishes. 
Tensions exploded in 1973, when Msgr. Casaroli reached an agreement with the 
Communists to appoint four new bishops. Unfortunately, all four men were members of 
"Pacem in Terris," and one, Bishop Vrana, was even its chairman. Many Catholics protested 
to Casaroli, believing it was better to have no Bishop at all than to have one who stood for 
everything against which the Church was fighting. It was ironic that the bishops who had 
opposed collaboration with an unreasonable government, realizing this collaboration meant 
the slow destruction of the Church, were overlooked by Rome (who was, itself, trying to 
negotiate with the government under the governments terms). Instead, the very priests who 
had made it known that, given the choice, loyalty to the state came before loyalty to Rome, 
were anointed bishops by Rome. 12 With the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyl'a to the papacy 
in 1978, such appointments ceased. 
Opposition to the 'peace movement' strengthened and finally, in 1982, the Sacred 
Congregation for the Clergy issued a decree prohibiting priests from participating in any 
political organization or professional association. Later in the year Cardinal Tomasek 
11 Bollog, Burton, "Vatican Rejects Secret Priests Ordained in Czechoslovakia," New York Times, 
April 12, 1992. 
12See Alexander Tomsky's article "Pacem in Terris' Between Church and State in Czechoslovakia," 
Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. I 0, Winter 1982, pp. 275-282. 
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received confirmation that the prohibition included "Pacem in Terris." Previous to that 
prohibition, about a third of the clergy had belonged to the movement. Alexander Tomsky, 
believing that the letter ended the split in the Church, wrote, "The possibility of occupying 
a middle position, where loyalty to God clashes with the demands of Caesar, with resulting 
moral confusion, has now disappeared. From now on there will be only one Catholic Church 
in Czechoslovakia--faithful to Rome, irrespective of whether the priests are recognized by 
th~ state or not."13 
Following the Papal prohibition, the rate of arrests and harassment of Catholic priests 
accelerated to the point that Tomasek began expressing the wish for complete autonomy for 
the Church, even stating the Church's willingness to pay priestly salaries. Due to the vague 
wording of the Church laws, priests were arrested for nearly any religious activity. The 
restrictions on the press exceeded those of the 1950's. Also, the tight control exercised over 
Toma!ek by the state prevented him from obtaining permission for Pope John Paul II to 
attend the 1100 year anniversary of the death of Saint Methodius in 1985 or the canonization 
of Blessed Agnes of Bohemia in 1987. 
The actions of the .Czech hierarchy after the Velvet Revolution proved that Tomsky's 
1982 optimism for an easy distinction between priests acceptable to Rome and those who 
were not an oversimplification. The years 1989-1992 were filled with sorting out the 
complications of a situation that proved extremely awkward at times. After 1989 the Vatican 
and the newly-appointed Archbishop Miloslav Vlk met with the former 'peace priests' in 
the fall of 1991 and allowed them to continue with their ministries after they had admitted 
their guilt, while the underground priests were suspended until they met with their own 
bishops and Archbishop Vlk in 1992 to determine the validity of their ordination. 
Many of the underground priests were disappointed. Those who were married when they 
were ordained were given the option to join the Greek-rite Church, which allows married 
priests or to give up the priesthood. The priests who had married after ordination were 
absolved from their priestly duties. All of the priestly actions they had performed during 
the Communist regime, however, were upheld ~s valid. The women were not allowed to 
apply for ordination; furthermore, their priestly actions were not considered valid. 
To many Catholics, the course of action taken· with regard to the underground Church 
seemed a bit .harsh and ~nappreciative. In the May 13, 1992, issue of Christian Century, Fr. 
Vaclav Maly worries that this action by the Vatican may lead to a lack of trust in Church and 
a split in the Church. The April 24, 1992, issue of the National Catholic Reporter criticized 
Ratzinger and the CDF (Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith] for "guillotining" some of 
131bid., p. 282. 
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the secretly ordained priests who "stuck their necks out in faith when countless others did 
not." 
The underground priests (currently active priests) with whom I spoke were willing to 
abide by the Vatican decision and the decision of Archbishop Vlk to accept all former 
state-recognized priests, no matter what their former associations had been, and no matter 
how fervently they had been opposed to them previously. It could be that the Church is 
simply weary of divisions and is more concerned with achieving one whole Church again 
than with stirring up old hurt that would have occurred had strict justice been the primary 
consideration. Or perhaps the shortage of priests makes them less selective.14 
At any rate, the "Velvet Revolution" ended the religious persecution without Rome's 
having formally considered which kind of compromises genuinely promote unity, and which 
kind only superficially cover up disunity with regard to the underground church. This 
failure spurs a more specific question: why was the Vatican more willing to recognize and 
work with priests who had at one time publicly named the Vatican a 'public enemy' rather 
than the more independent-minded underground priests who had risked imprisonment and 
endured untold hardships to preserve the faith, never taking an oath against Rome? Such a 
question is admittedly rhetorical, given the Church's inherent need of hierarchy and legality. 
For its part, the Czech Catholic hierarchy today may not be working as hard as it might 
to insure that government control of the Church will never cripple the Church again. 
Although Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek had called for a complete separation of church and 
state in an April, 1986 letter to the minister of culture because the then-current legislation 
was so vaguely defined that almost any religious activity could be called criminal, such a 
separation never came about. Currently the Church still receives funds from the state 
government, which pays a portion of priestly salaries and subsidizes the few Catholic schools 
in existence. Admittedly, the state has been slow to return all of the church property that 
had been requested. It should be noted, though, that at no time in Czech history has there 
been legal separation of church and state. The state has always subsidized the church. 
In 1991 the Archbishop of Prague, Miloslav Vlk, declined the new government's offer 
to restore ownership of the Church's confiscated property except for church buildings and 
schools. In an April 13 interview with ORF, Vlk explained that the Church did not wish to 
ask for "too much." Rather, just enough to release the state from the duty of preserving it. 
He said the Church would demand "only the necessary" to make possible the activity and 
14Janice Broun claims in the mid-1980s there were about 30 new priests ordained from state 
seminaries each year. The death rate for priests was about 50 per year. See Broun, Janice, 
Conscience and Captivity, (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), p. 77. 
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upkeep of the Church.15 For a while it was thought that state-subsidization of salaries would 
gradually decline until they were eliminated, but this turned out to be unfeasible. Today the 
Church remains financially dependent upon the state, and the future prospects for 
independence are in question; 
15Cited in "Interview mit Toma~ek-Nachfolger Vlk," .Giaube in Der 2. Welt, Vol. 19, No. 5, 
1991, pp. 0-14. 
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